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Va ndrht Ti u niversjtv
Indexing and the Fight
against Inflation
Policymakers and ordinary citizens allover the Western World are seeking
ways to deal with an apparently unstoppable andsocially divisive inflation.
As during previous inflationary episodes,many are looking again at index-
ing of monetary contracts dS a palliativeor an aid in solving the inflation
problem. Indexingmeans expressing contracts in real instead ofmoney
terms. This is clone by periodicallyadjusting the nominal terms in which
the contract is written for changesin the money price of thecommodity or
market basket of commoditiesto which the contract is tied. The desirefor
indexing sterns partly froman inability to forecast the future priceof
commodities accurately in terms ofmoney, or, in other words, to a loss of
faithin money as a standard ofvalue.
Broadly speaking, thereare two main classes of contractsto which
indexing can be, and has been,applied. They arewages and debts of
various sorts. During the postwarperiod many countries haveadopted sonic form of debt indexing, andcost of living escalatorson wage contracts
are also widespread. Thesemeasures have, by and large, beenpartial and voluntary. What isnewri the current situation is thesuggestion that we shou idconsider aclopti rig a farmore cornprehensise system ofi ndexi rig, one which would cover allwage contracts arid perhaps all debtcontracts as well.
What are thearguments for and against compreherisieindexing? Would a shift to such a system aid theUnited States in itsstruggle to contain
NOTE:IblU paper was presented ai theiPENBER Seminar on tndesaijonFeb 26-28, i97SI'artral suppurt ir the paper was pros idecl bthe U.S. Dr'parinientr'thy In',io rThe a Ut h n o '.hirs thank Ruben A!monacjd wHam Branson,Roberto Macedo MI, Nadjrjand Affono Pastore tor commentson pres'Ioys clratis Ot this paper
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inflation as proponents claim? Is the experience of Brazil with its indexing
system relevantfor the United States? These are the main questions that I
Uversiy'-[V want to considerhere.
In analyzing the relation between indexing and inflationIfoundit
important to distinguish between situations in which relative prices do not
change and those in which they do. Much of the disagreement about the
effects of indexing is traceable to assumptions about relative price move-
ments. Also, unlike most previous writing on the subject, my study focuses
primarily on wage indexing, since the labor market is(he key to our
understanding of price and output movements during inflation and stabili-
zation. The paper, then, is organized as follows. Section one is an analysis
of wage and debt indexing in a one-sector economy. In section two the
analysis is extended to wage indexing in a world where relative prices are
changing. Section three contains a discussion of the Brazilian indexing
system and its relevance to the problem of stabilization through indexing.
Section four, finally, discusses some practical problems in the use of wage




I lation illWAGE AND DEBT INDEXATION IN A
money ONE-SECTOR ECONOMY
which
dity or Indexing of Wage Contracts
sire for Far and away the most important and least discussed type of indexing is
ice of cost of living adjustment (hereafter COL of wages. Consider first how an
loss of automatic and complete systemof COL adjustments would affect an
economy. First we assume that all prices movetogether, or equivalently,
which that we are in a one-sector economy. Ac we shall see further on, oneof the
bts of main differences of opinion between advocates and opponentsof indexing
lopted concerns its effect in inflations where relative pricesdo change.
r.tracts Wage contracts with full adjustment for changes inthe COL are in effect
al and written in real terms. That is, the real wage. or wage rate in termsof units
at we of output, is independent of the price level. This has the veryfar-reaching
lexing, implication that the level of employment is independentof the level of
tracts prices, too. For with COL adjustments, both businessmenand workers
know exactly therealterms on whichlaborisbeing hired.The
VouId businessman will not hire the worker mjn less his real wage isless than or
()ntain equal to his marginal product, and the worker wii1 not accepteniployment
unless the real wage that he receives at least compensateshim for the
disutility of working. If employment is independent of the pricelevel, then
ments on so, too, is the level of production. In otherwords, the economy with full78
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COL adjustment would Operatejustlike the neoclassicaleConorn' of
inacrueconoinic theory, in which employment andOutput are determined
by productivity and willingnessto work, and in which the moneysupply
only determines the price level, withno feedback into the real workingsof the economy.
Because in our currentsystem COL adjustments are notwidespread
most of us are forced to predict future changesin the cost of livingwhen
entering into a labor contract. Duringperiods of substantial pricestability this is not particularly important,but during periods like thepresent, when
prices are rising rapidly,an underestimate of price changesover the life of
a labor contract will mean that the workeris working for a lower realwage than he realizedor agreed to when he entered into thecontract. Con- versely,if he overestimates the futureinflation rate he will demandan excessively high real wage,one at which it may be impossible for himto find work.
Consider now howan inflationary cycle and stabilizationwork under
our current arrangements. Keepin rhind that weare still working with an
economy in which all prices riseat the same rate. As longas prices are rising at a rate whicheveryone can correctly predict,regardless of what that rate is, the levelof output and employmentshould be at the level corresponding to the normal fullemployment of the labor force.Now suppose that there is anunexpected increase inaggregate demand. This will cause anunexpected inflation.It will mean thatbusinessmen can afford to offer highernominal wages than beforebecause they know that these higherwages can be more than offset bythe higher pricesat which output can now be sold. Theresult is the classicdemand-pull inflationary boom. Output andemployment rise above theirnormal levels for as long as the inflation rate is higherthan workersexpect it to be. Now look at theopposite side of this inflationarycycle, the stabilization
phase. Suppose that thegovernment wants to drive theinflation rate toa lower level. To do thatit must in someway induce people to lower their
















of Thisis why unemp!oynient rises.Itis obvious that this"supernormal"
ed unemployment can occur even if the actual inflation is positive, long as
it is less thanpeople expect it to be. This is also whystabilization is more
of difficult the more firmly inflation is entrenched in people'sexl)er-tations
In an economy with automatic COL adjustments, the high outputcost
of stabilization would be eliminated. This is just a particular instance of the
en independence of employment and output from the price level discussed
ty above. Let us see how such a system would work. Under indexing, workers
en would not demand wage increases to cover expected futUre inflation
of because any losses in real wages they suffer through inflation are irnmedi-
ge ately returned to them through the COL adjustment. Here is the crucial
ri- difference between the system with and without indexing. Becauseno
an price level forecast is built into current ss'age levels,itis not possible for
to workers to overpredict inflation and to demand too high a money wage
which is what causes the recession during stabilization. A reduction in the
ler actual inflation rate through restrictive demand management by the gov-
an ernment will be smoothly and automatically matched by a reduction in the
ire rate of increase in money wages. Under the ideal index, the real wage
at never deviates from its equilibrium level, and neither does unemployment.
vel Further on we will consider some of the practical l)roblenls involved in
iw constructing the "ideal" index. Assuming that these are not insurmount-
his able, indexing offers the possibility of moving an economy from a high toa
an
: lower rate of inflation without incurring the high unemployment cost
hat usually associated with such a maneuver. This is the main reason why the
ich indexing proposal has begun to attract supporters.
The main proponent of indexing is Milton Friedman. He has argued for ary
the measure in several short Newsweek articles and in longer papers in ng
Challenge and Fortune. Judging by the comments on these papers, there is
on some confusion over his argument, which has been construed by some to
a mean that indexing reduces the rate of inflation. This is untrue, of course.
eir The rate of inflation in an economy is not determined by the existence or
ual absence of indexing, except possibly in the short run. Friedman does argue
that the rate of inflation will lie lower in an indexed economy. However,
Ve that is not because of a direct relationship between indexing and prices,
by but because the government is unlikely to have the willpower to carry out
rn- stabilizationin a nonindexed economy, since the high unemployment
al rates it causes are unacceptable to the public. Indexing, by reducing this
on unemployment cost, makes stabilization more feasible and more likely.
lat One cannot put this better than Friedman himself:
to How can we make it politically feasible to er-id inflation much sooner? As I see it,
eir only by adopting measures that will reduce the side effects from ending inflation.
These sde effects fundamentally reflect distortions introduced into relative pricesa
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by UI; 'pal; 'd intlat onr dci I at 'in, di to, ti ()flst ii a I a ii e I);; an seIn Ira; Is are enteredniiI cnn st n en ma Ipro es non 'r m takenx' ri t'ptiris a boot th likely ; noise of inflation.
The way to redtic e thesesick' ctti'( tsis to make in tracts in realternisnifl nnrnina terms. Thisan be done by the \vides1)re,lduse ot escalator Idoses
Indexing of Debt Contracts
Before turning toan analysis o wage indexingin a fflultisectorCcononiy we pause to consider the
rnacroeconon,ic effects of debtindexing. The idea of expressing debtrepayment tn terms 01 commodityunits rather than money is not new. EarlyEnglish contractswere tied to corn,and gold clause tieswere common in the nineteenthcentury. In the postwarworld indexing of Varioustypes of debt waswidespread; it was usedin China, Finland France SwedenAustria, Brazil, andseveral other countries iTwo postwar snnovatio,swere the use of a price ndexrather than acOi11modjt tie, arid theextension of indexingto short-term loans. Chinaeven went so far as to indexbank deposits. DuringtheI 950s indexed bondsproved to be extremelypopular. By 1956indexed bondsaccounted for 92percent of all bonds issuedin that year inIsrael, 84percent in Finland, and60 percent in France. In 1960it was estirnatc'cJ inFinland that 80percent of the volume offinancial creditoutstanding hadan index clause.But the idea has nevertaken hold in eitherEngland or the UnitedStates, whereno indexed securitieshave ever beenissued except forthe famous and abortive KardexCompany bonds issuedwhen Irving Fisherwas associated with thecompany in 1925.























11C returnsof indexedand unindexed debt. His main resuh is thatifreal
the returns onequitY arenegatively correlated with inflation, indexed bonds
willcomniand a pretinum overnominal bonds: the real rate ofnterest
not
required to inducebondh0klto hold an indexed bond will be less than
the expectedrate on nominalbonds. This is because the portfolio holder
cannot hedgeagainst inflation by holding equity.Obviously, if equity is a
hedge againstinflationthere need be no such premium, which may
explain whyindexed bonds never succeeded inthe United States.
What are themaCrOeC0Ii0meffects of debt indexation? To my kriowl-
omy, edge, the mostcomplete analysis of this question isoffered by Robson. He,
The like otherearlier writers, bases hisanalysis on the relationship between
than indexing, saving,and investment. At one time,debt indexing was sup-
gold ported in thebelief thatit would increase saving and thusbe anti-
Aorld nflatioflary. The argumentran that with indexingthe real rate of interest
hina, would rise, whichwould increase saving. A variant ofthis view is that if
Two indexed securities wereavailable, less saving WOLIICI take the formof real
iodity asset acculflUlaUofl,that is, indexing wouldreduce the overall demand for
nt so commodities to beused as a hedge against inflation.But, as Robson
it'd to showed, the issue is agood deal more comphcated thanthat. In order to he
rcerit antiinflatiOnarY, one mustshow that saving rises and investmentfalls with
iii 60 indexing, for, if the extrasaving is channeled into extracapital formation,
ent of there will not be anylessening in demand. Robsonlooks at the market for
ut the loanable funds.If everyone on bothsides of the market has the same
crc no expectations aboutinflation, ex-post real rates onnominal and indexed
is and securities will be equaland indexing will have noeffect. But this is not true
?ciated if expectations differ.Then it is only for themarginal borrower and lender
that expected inflation rates areequal. All those borrowerswho think that
? Most the inflation rate is going tobe less than the rateexpected by the marginal
d with borrower will issueindexed securities. For themthe perceived real interest
spects. rate will havefallen with indexing.That should increasenvestment
tection demand. By the same argument,all lenders who thinkthat the inflation rate
Fischer is going to be greaterthan the rate expectedby the marginallender will
to the purchase indexed debt instruments.For them theperceived real interest
ver the rate will have risei,which will increase saving.One cannotconclude
is no whether the net anti-inflationaryeffect ol inrlexing ispositive or negative
9dexed because both investmentand saving will rise.However, in either case
rose an indexing should increasecapital formation, whichis antiinfiatiOnarYin the
pdcxed long run, even if not in theshort run.
First lie While these various analysesof indexed debt areinteresting, they ignore
n asset the strongest argument in favorof the dpviceieffect during stahiliza
LiSCS a tion. During stabilizations the rateof inflatioiiis (icing forceddown by
)del he restrictive governmentdemandmafl3gemetpolicies.In an economy
es and without indexation, the burdenof this maneuverrests on borrowers.Ita
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there is an unexpected deflationor just a rise in prices at a rate less
than expected, borrowers will discoverex post that they borrowed at too high
a nominal rate of interest. This is preciselyanalogous to the case in thelabor market, where we saw that duringstabilization labor tends todemand too high a real wage, with the resultthat unemployment rises.Stabilization without indexing ofwages places the burden of adjustingexpectations about prices on the labor force.in the market for loanable fundsstabiliza. tion without indexing placesthis same burdenon borrowers.
When we analyzedthe arguments for and againstindexing ofwage contracts, we found that thestrongest argument in favor of themeasure was that it marie stabilization politicallyfeasible by eliminating muchof its unemployment cost. Thatargument is reinforced by thesame consid erations in the funds market.An economy without indexeddebt instru- ments will find it politically difficultto stabilize because of therisk that during the stabilizationperiod borrowers willgo bankrupt. Focked into
high nominal interestrates they thought would becovered by rising prices,
borrowers may be forced intoa financial crisis. Then thepressure on the
government to ease up on the stabilizationpolicy will intensify_it willbe politically difficult to allowbusinesses to go bankruptand workers to he of unemployed when thegovernment has the means to increasedemand and avoid this unpleasantsituation.
Debt indexing eliminatesthe problem of bankruptcydue to unexpected deflation. The rate ofinterest ex post is equalto sonic contractedinterest the rate, presumably the realrate, plus the rate ofinflation. As the rate of inflation falls,so does the nominal interestrate. Hence, stabilizationwould not bring the threat ofbankruptcy tO firms and,also to the point, wouldnot bring politicalpressure for its abandonment
ifl
Output
[Ill INDEXINGWITH CHANGINGRELATIVE PRICES
So far we have beenconsidering theargunlerits for and against indexingin an economy where relativeprices do not changeeven though the overall price level may. Yetmuch of theOpposition to indexingarises when people think about itseffects in an inflationthat seems to becaused h
I
rising prices inone particular sector. Forexample, with indexing,inflation
Prce in an impoantsector like agricultureor fuel would be spreadimmediately
:
to all other sectorsthrough its impacton the cost of living andthus on nominal wages. Arecent article by WalterHeller in the WallStreet Journal is a goodexample of this point ofview:


































Indexing and Inflation 83
.,'ages. Thus itwould have put relentless cost-push pressure on the general price
level- Under the present system, onehas at least a fighting chance to avoid
unvcrting the 1 97_74 ''soIl-ure'inflation ... into a ''hard-core'' once-wage
spiral reaching well intothe future.
Because of its uneven impacts,then, our existing systemthrows sand into the
gears ofinflation. Indexing would oilthe gears and speed the process of
inflation.4
Helter's argument has greatintuitive appeal but I believe that it is wrong.
As we saw inthe one-sector model, wage indexing isequivalent to fully
incorporating any price feedback intonominal wage demands. Labor
supply is a function of thereal rather than the nominal wage. Now if one
believes, asIdo, that any full equilibriumin the labor market must
incorporate the pricefeedback roin all sectors, one must conclude that the
full or long-run equilibriumof a molt isector model will be the same with or
without indexing, except in onepossibly important case to be discussed
below. Hence any differencebetween the indexed and the unindexed
multiseCtor economy canonly be temporary.
To look more carefully atthe short-run differences between the reactions
of an economy with andwithout indexing, one can construct a simple
Iwo-sector model in whichlabor supply in each sector is a function of
nominal wages in the short run andreal wages in the long run. Indexing is
equivalent to perfect foresight. or tothe introduction of current prices into
the labor supply functions. liithe goods markets relative priceswould be
set in the commoditymarkets and the aggregate price level, bythe diliantity
theory equation. Now impose onthis economy an exogenous supply
shocksay, a reduction in the outputof one sector. To motivate the
exercise one could think ofthe sector as agriculture and ofthe shift as
being an exogenous worseningin the weather. What are the effects on
output and prices of such an adverseshock in the short and the long run,
or equivalently, inthe indexed and the unindexedeconomy?
Because of the quantity theory equationthis question turns out to be an
easy one to answer. In theshort run, prices in theaffected sector go up an(i
output falls.If the demand for the outputof the sector is pi ice-inelastic
(elastic), prices and output fallfrise) in the other sector.In the inelastic
case, since output is fatlingin both sectors, we knowthat the aggregate
price index must rise. In the elastic case,since prices are going upin both
sectors, the output index of the economy asa whole mustfall. Hence we
know that in the short run the aggregateprice index must riseand total
output must fall.
Now compare this short-run, orunindexed, solution to the long-run, or
indexed, solution. Moving to indexing meansallowing labor to react to
changes in the price level. Since ineither the elastic or theinelastic case















since a price rise reduces labor supply in both sectors, theoutput level of
the economy WIll fall furtherri the long run than it did in the short, andthe
long-run price level will be higher.
The short-run ditterences between the indexedand the unindexe(jtwo-
sector economies are exactly parallelto the One-sector (ase.Inthe
uric-Sector model we found that whenever the price levelis higher than
expected by labor, output temporarilyrises above its long-run equilibriurn
level. In the tsvo-sectoreconomy the supply shock unexpectedlyraises
prices above the level perceived by labor.Even though output falls, itis
higher than it will be in the longrun, when the full supply-reducing effects
of rising prices become reflected inwage demands.
To return to the Hellerargument, our conclusion is that indexing hasno
effect whatsoever on the finalequilibrium level of eitherprices or output,
but that it does affect the speedwith which the economy reachesequilib- rium after,say, an oil embargo or a crop failure.Under our current
arrangements it is true that sectors other than thosein which the inflation
originates are insulated fora time from rising sectoral prices. But onlyfor a tinie. As the cost of livingIncreases workers willbegin to demand
compensating increases in theirwages, despite the fact that pricesmay not have risen in theirown sectors. The process is fast andautomatic under indexing and,I am tempted tosay, slow and painful without indexing.
During the disequilibriumadjustment period, prices will behigher under indexing, but thatsags nothing about their final level.
We have stressed that the finallevel of prices andoutput should he
independent of indexing. Yetone could make quite a strongcase for the position that, in actuality, therate of inflation might well be higherfor the unindexed economy becauseof the problem ofexpectations. Predictions of future inflationare not a problem in the indexedeconomy because all rises in the COL are automaticallyreflected in ex-postwage adjustnients. By contrast, in the unindexedeconomy workers must forecastfuture inflation rates, and ills therefore possiblethat the economy wilreact to a one-time shock by movingto a permanently higherrate of inflatioii. For the"new" theory of inflationdemonstrates that aneconomy can reach its equilibrium level of outputat any rate of inflationas long as that rateis forecast correctly. Now, if the risein food prices thatwe have just been analyzing were to lead labor to forecasta rise in the inflationrate, the unindexed economy would be forcedto choose betweenaccepting a permanently higher rate of inflationequal to thenew rate expected bysvorkers, or accepting a period ofstabilizitiori while thoseexpectations are forced back to their original level.In the indexedeconomy, prices would jumpimme- diately to theirlong-run level, butthere would beno change in the permanent rate of inflation. Ifone thinks thatgovernments are unwilling to pay the political price ofstabilizationthen the one-timeshift in supply,dexiu1g andInflation
which causedaonce-and-t0 change in prices under indexing, may
well lead toapermantlY higherinflation rate without indexing, judg-
ing byrecent eventsin the U.S. economy,
Ijudge that this possibility is
ot just acuriosity, but isindeed occurring at present. Peopletalk asthe
bad harvest(of 1974) wasgoing to cause a permanentinflation, not lust a
onetime risein prices.Wage demands reflectthese pessimistic expecta-
tionsabout futureprices, and this, of course,makes it that much more
difficult toavoid inflation inthe future.
[1111 INDEXINGIN BRAZIL
ri recentyears Brazilhas applied monetarycotrection to a wide varietyof
nionetary contracts,including taxes, wagesand debt instruments) During
the periodthese measures werebeing adopted. Brazilsuccessfully reduced
her inflationfrom around 90percent in 1964 to someiS percent in 1973
whileaintaifling a realannual growth rate of some4 percent per capita.
It is not toosurprising then thatBrazil should be held up byadvocates of
indexing as anexample of thesuccessful application oftheir program,
namely successfulstabilization withoutthe usual output cost.
My purpose hereis not to arguewhether this sort ofpost-hoc reasoning
is wise in theBrazilian case. I want tomake another pointwhich seems to
have beenoverlooked inall the discussionof indexing inBrazil.Itis
simply this. On the wageside Brazilis not anexample of the sort of
indexing systemproposed by Friedman.In the Friedmansystem. which is
the one that wehave been discussingin this paper,inflation correction on
wages is always expost. Wage adjustmentsare made forpast inflation but
not for futureexpected inflation. Thisis not the casein the Brazilian
system. In Brazil, wageincreases aregranted to restorethe real wage
prevailing over the previoustwenty-four monthsand to offset future or
expected increases in pricesand productivitY.Some part ofthe current
wage level isthus an offset toexpected future inflation.Much of the
argument over theapplication of the wagepolicy was overthe underfore
casting of inflation.
The key element inthe Friedman wage
indexing system isex-POSt
adjustment. wages shouldcontain noexpected inflationcomponent. for
that is the only way toavoid thenemp10yn1e0t costsof stabilization.
Whether wages are set in private
negotiations or bygovernment decree,if
they contain an offset toinflation over thelife of the contractfor which
they are set, any successfuleffort to reducethe inflationbelow that forecast
rate must mean by definitionthat ex-postreal wagelevels are going tobe








































fall during stabilizationso long as wage indexingcontains anexpected inflation component Thisis precisely what ex-post indexingis desigfw(Jto avoid.
There is a certainirony in the failure of Brazil, wherethe govern,ii1 had the power tochange the form by whichwages were setin an inflationary economy,to use that power forintroducing fun(lamer)tal reforms. Expected inflation,which had beenan informal featureo pres'i- ous wage negotiations,instead of beingeliminated wasspecifically legalized in bindingwage formulas which includedfuture inflation.True the rate of expectedinflation was arbitrarilyreduced, but thatsimply opened thegovernment to charges of favoritismwhenever therate of inflation wasunderforecast, asitoften was in theearly years of the program. All of this controversycould have beenavoided by anex-post system, where inflationtransfers between workersand capitalistsare car automatically restored. Bycontinuing with a newversion of the old expectations system_withe government rallierthan unions makingthe forecasts_thegovernment has put itself inthe unenviableposition of
a seeming to decideon the incidence ofinflation. This hastended to maximize controversyover wage policy withoutgaining anypermanent benefit in stabilizationproperties for theeconomy.
a;terna For all theSupposed imperfections ofthe Brazilianinflation program, one has to admit that therate of inflation inBrazil was reducedwith an extraordinarily small lossin output and employmentHow was thisdone with a wage policywhichI have arguedwas not a particularlygood stabilization tool? Icontend that stabilizationin Brazil is reallyan example of the successfuluse of wage and pricecontrols coupled withconsistent macropolicy, rather thanindexing. Thegovernment, as s'e haveseen, had
enexr
the power toarbitrarily set tilerate of expectedinflation at any level,It used this powerto bring down theinflation of wagerates at the same time it was controllingand rpfnrminrtL..,. .....
flimmat.
,5LlltdX sysieni to reducegovernne deficits andexpasion of themoney supply. In a marketeconomy without any central controlover wage settlements,the move to lowerexpected inflation ratesrequires a period ofunemployment becauseexpectations
ere














































while a strong casecan be madefor indexing on theoretical grounds there
areseveral formidablepractical problems Ot implementation which have
caused many to opposethe measure. The first is, of course, that no perfect
index exists in aworld where different prices are rising atdilferent rates.
The indexwhich perfectly reflects changesin the cost of living of the rich
would be inappropriatein the case of the poor. Prices indifferent regions
of the country ordifferent sectors of the economy behavedifferently.
Relative pricesbetween sectors andregions are constantly changing. This
means that evenwith indexing,irifIationaiy redistrihutions cannot be
entirely eliminated.Indeed, inflation risk could beexacerbated by indexing
because of thespeed with which inflationaryimpulses would he transmit-
ted between sectors.However, I do not think thatthese problems in the use
of any aggregateindex are weighty enough todictate abandoning indexing
altogether. For thequestion that one must askis whether indexing with an
admittedly unsatisfactory
index is better than the other alternativepolicies
available to us. Obviously,everyone wouldprefer a world with stable
prices and noneed of indexing. But that isnot the world we live in. In our
current situationindexing appears to me tobe less bad than any other
alternative I haveconsidered for either livingwith or getting rid of inflation.
A secondpractical problem with theindexing of wages concerns time
lags. Clearly, it isimpossible to adjust wagesinstantaneously as prices rise.
lithe system is suchthat the equilibrium real wageis reached at the time of
the periodic inflationadjustment, then over timethe average real wagewill
obviously lie below thisequilibrium whenever there is aninflation. One
solution for this is tomake a provision for futureexpected inflation prior to
the next wage settlement.This, as we have seen, wasthe solution used in
Brazil. But it is not agood solution for the reasonsdiscussed in section
three. The most obviousalternative is to reduce theadjustment period and
eliminate the inflation forecast.However, if this isdone, one must reim-
burse wage earners, ex post,for all losses due toinflation. To do this it is
not sufficient to simplyadjust wages by theamount of inflation.For,
whenever prices go up,workers in effect make aninterest-free loan to
business; they should bereimbursed for this loan.Leaving aside pro-
ductivity for the momentand referring to Figurei, suppose thatthe
equilibrium real wage in thelabor market is W.Suppose that wageshave
been set so that W_ ./P-.1 =W Now prices rise to P,.Before any wage
readjustment the real wage hasfallen to W1/P. Overthe period t-1 to t,
the worker haslentan amountequal to the triangleABC to the
businessman. At time t, heshould receive a coiadjustment in hisnominal

























That will restore thereal wage levelto W. But in addition,the worker should he compensatedfor the loan he hasinadvertently made, litherate of inflationover the period isconstant, he should get 1+ r times the area in triangle ABC wherer is the rate of interestover tile adjustment period.
Inflationary loanrepayment = W1_1 (-_._)(1 ± r)
for P,_T=









equal to W1(1 +A) = W,. Again, workers make a loan to business equal
to triangle DEF, forwhich they are compensated. That amount is
W1_1A(1 +r)
2
Putting both the inflation and productivity correctionstogether, wages at
timeshould be:
W_1 (1 + + X)
nts Pt_I
In addition, a lump-sum payment should bemade at timeof
this W_1(1 +r) ( PP_1+
and 2 P1P_1
Oil. The advantage of this system is that it makes inflationnondiscriminatory
in and does not build in erroneous expectations about the future.It would
cy. handle sudden changes ininflationand, equally important, sudden
d e changes in productivity. It would meet the objectionof many that indexing
iire would create an explosive inflation when the rise in prices comesfrom a
real fall in output due to adverse weather or a change in the termsof trade
of caused by events like the oil embargo. Both of these occurrencesmean a
its, fall in the average output per worker, which is, of course,reflected in 3
just drop in the productivity term of our wage equation. lambdacould even be
ay negative. When that happens real wages would not rise attheir trend rate.
In this way real incomes would be adjusted downward toreflect the
ecL reduction in supply available to the economy.
ro- Severai critics of indexing maintain that, If all incomesand assets were
he protected from inflation by indexing, any reduction in netsupply would
lime-_fl
4
cause an explosive inflation, since the role of prices in reducingaggregate
demand would be drastically diminished. Thiswould he particularlytrue ii
the tax system were indexedas Friedman has advocated. 0n thesupp
side, indexing tends to make theaggregate supply of the economy mdc.
pendent of prices. It will do thesame thing on the demand side. ForPrices reduce demand in threeways, two of which would be negatedby
comprehensive indexing. First, rising pricesmay rcdistributincome in the
private sector to people with higher propensitiesto save, i.e., fromwages
to profits, Second, inflation redistiibutes incometo the government, since
the entire tax system is written innominal terms and since the taxrates are
progressive. Third, rising prices reduce thereal nioney supply, which
reduces demand through its effecton investment and consumption. Only
the third effect would be leftwere comprehensive indexing adopted.There
is, thus, the possibility that the demand and supplycurves of the economy
svi II be so close to vertical that theprice level will be extremelyunstable.
Friedman's answer to this chargeis thatitisriot too serious, since the
opposite side of theargument is that the real sector ismore stable, i.e.,
closer to its full employmentlevel, which is more importantthan the price level.
I find the prospect of suchprice instability unattractive. Toavoid it we
could either make the CDLadjustment less than completeor not index the
tax system. In the formercase, during any inflation, there would bea
transfer from wages to profitsthat would never be madeup. In the latter
case, the transfers would be to thegovernment. Most wage indexing
schemes have the former effect.While this means that inflationtransfers income from wages toprofits, the partial adjustmentalso reflects the
undoubted fact that eachof us can avoidsome of the costs of inflation
because of our abilityto substitute away from high-pricedproducts. This is
a value-ridden question, but I thinkthat the advantage lieson the side of not indexing governmenttaxliabilities.This makes the taxsysteni an
automatic stabilizer of prices. Butmore important, it means thatinflation would not redistributeincome betweengroups in the private sector,as would any scheme of partialindexing. As Isee it, the biggest danger of
inflation is that itsets various groups againsteach other because it takes income away fromsonic and gives it to others. Takingincome away from everybody equally andgiving it to thegovernment should create a strong constituency in favor ofprice stability and relieve socialtensions between labor and businessat the same time.
CONCLUSION
















unemPlOYnient arid output level of the economy more i
ndependeiit of the
level of prices, and second, that it reduces the social frictions
generated by
inflation by et!minattng the redistribution of income and wealthcaused by unexpected deflation. In an economy without indexingitis the role of
expected prices in wage and debt contracts which is themajor deterrent to
successful stabilization, for these gLiarantee unemploymentand financial
hardship when the economy moves from one inflation rateto a lOwer one.
Ironically, and apparently contradictory to logic and intuition,a system that
compensates for past Price increases automatically may have lowerinfla-
tion rates than one that does not, because reaching a desiredprice level
generates less political Ol)POSitiOri with indexing than without. Thatis just
the result of removing the price level further from the real worldwith
indexing than without.If the important variables in theecOnomy like
employment, the terms of borrowing, arid investment are unaffectedby the
level of prices, then the public svil I be relatively indifferent to whatl)rice
level the government decides to Set. None of these advantages ofindexing
are reversed in a sectoral inflation, as 5011W Critics have claimed
Inflationis a terribly divistve social I)hleflomenon. Underour present
arrangenients everyOLI) 'S forced to try to protect its real income by
using whatever poltical or ecutloflhi power it has. Maximum discord is
generated. Indexingisa mechanism that would make these inflation
adjustments automatically and without any strife. It is a remedy that would
make the disease of inflation easier to live with and at the same time easier
to cure because of the reduced unemployment during stabilization. Not
many inflation medications can make such a claim.
In attempting to decide on the applicability or wisdom of indexation,
both proponents and opponents have studied Brazil as an example ofwage
indexing. This is an error. Brazil should not be thought of asn example of
wage indexing, at least of the sort proposed by Friedman. For the Brazilian
system does not merely adjust wages cx post for past inflation, but, instead,
raises them in advance for future expected inflation. This is fundamentally
different from the Friedman proposal, which is that inflation adjustments
should always be made cx post. The Brazi Ii ans did reduce inflation
succesfully with their indexiig system, but this was due to the govern-
ment's power to enforce wage and price levels consistent with restrictive
monetary and fiscal policy. Thus, Brazil's case should be thought of as the
successful apphicatioii01selectiverice and wage controlsand not
indexation-__during stabi Ii z,ition,
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